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Abstract 
So far, research on sustainable transitions has predominantly focussed on the 
management of innovation processes and mostly neglected that political 
decision-making has also to consider the discontinuation of the established 
socio-technical regime. We will present a case study on the automobility regime 
as an example of discontinuation governance “in the making”. Analysing 
policies and actor constellations on local, national, and supranational levels, we 
try to figure out strategies and measures that have been applied to (politically) 
challenge the automobility regime. Additionally, we propose combining three 
analytical models in order to grasp these developments, namely the multi-level 
perspective (MLP), the multi-level governance (MLG) and actor-centred 
approaches. 
 
Highlights 
• This paper examines (political) attempts to discontinue the automobili-
ty regime. 
• Different analytical frameworks (multi-level perspective, multi-level 
governance and actor-centred approaches) are used to investigate a ne-
glected phenomenon: regime discontinuation. 
• The case study shows that the European Union is an active actor in at-
tempts to restrict automobility, especially exerting “landscape” pres-
sure. 
• In spite of many challenges, the automobility regime still remains re-
markably stable. 
 
Keywords 
Discontinuation, governance, automobility, socio-technical regimes, sustaina-
bility 
1 Introduction 
During the last decades, environmental issues (such as climate change, fossil 
fuel dependency and rising greenhouse gas emissions) have taken a pivotal 
place in political, societal and industrial debates. Since about a fourth of the 
EU’s energy is used for transportation (of passengers and goods), measures to 
deal with environmental challenges are highly related to the organization of 
transportation (cf. Eurostat 2006). The private passenger car with internal 
combustion engine (ICE) is located at the centre of the automobility regime 
and represents the dominant way of how (personal) mobility is attained. Fig-
ures on modal share and motorization rates underline the dominance and sta-
bility of this system. With about 83%, the car represents the major share of 
total inland passenger kilometres travelled in the European Union in 2012 (cf. 
Eurostat 2014). Therefore, in order to achieve a more sustainable way of per-
sonal transportation, the current regime needs to be challenged. But how can 
we deviate from a strong and established technology such as the fossil-fuelled 
passenger car?  
Research on socio-technical transitions has predominantly focussed on policy 
making fostering innovations (see e.g. Loorbach 2007): Technological break-
throughs, radical novelties, and innovation-networks have been regarded as key 
to success when creating new socio-technical systems, which may compete 
with the incumbent one and finally succeed in replacing it (cf. among others 
Geels and Schot 2007). However, socio-technical systems cannot be changed 
by merely developing innovative solutions or alternatives because of highly 
institutionalized actor constellations, infrastructures, and routines. Hence, we 
assume that the management of regime change also requires the (deliberate) 
discontinuation of well-established and powerful socio-technical regimes (such 
as the automobility regime with its core technology of the ICE-based car) – an 
issue that so far has been neglected in transition research (for exceptions see 
Stegmaier et al. 2014; Turnheim and Geels 2013). 
Our case study (Section 3) investigates practices of discontinuation and strives 
to identify mechanisms and key factors of a governance of discontinuation. 
Unlike other cases of (enacted) discontinuation like the German energy transi-
tion, the ban of light bulbs in the European Union, or the worldwide ban of 
the insecticide DDT (cf. Stegmeier et al. 2014), the transformation of automo-
bility is a case of ‘discontinuation in the making’ rather than a successful or 
concluded one. Comparing different actor constellations and policy measures 
in four different countries (UK, Germany, France and Netherlands) and on the 
EU level, we want to figure out strategies that challenge the regime of (ICE-
based) automobility. We will analyse actors, strategies, governance-levels, and 
measures taken to overcome this dominant regime and achieve sustainable 
mobility. In doing so, we aim at contributing to a better understanding of the 
discontinuation of established socio-technical regimes. Our findings will show 
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that in spite of mostly ambivalent national politics, the interplay between na-
tional level(s) and the supranational level of the EU has produced a kind of 
dynamics that may open a window of opportunity to dismantle the ICE-
regime. 
The empirical case study at hand is guided by a theoretical concept of multi-
level governance of socio-technical regimes (Sections 2 and 4). It takes the 
multi-level perspective (Geels and Schot 2007) as a starting point, but in an 
extended version, which is complemented by two other concepts: actors net-
works (cf. Weyer et al. 1997) and multi-level governance (cf. Bache and 
Flinders 2004). 
2 Multi-level governance of socio-technical regimes 
In this Section, we will briefly discuss the theoretical concepts and identify 
their research gaps (2.1 to 2.3). Afterwards, we will propose an integrated 
framework of multi-level governance of socio-technical regimes (2.4). 
2.1 The multi-level perspective of socio-technical change 
The multi-level perspective (MLP) has been developed in order to study re-
gime shifts – mostly from an innovation-oriented viewpoint. It has proved to 
be a valuable tool for social studies of technology since it depicts regime 
change as the result of an interplay of three different levels: niche, landscape 
and regime (Geels and Schot 2007: 399f). While the regime is constituted by 
dominant structures, cultures, routines, and conventions (Geels 2012: 473), 
niches are crucial for transitions and serve as an incubation room for the de-
velopment and testing of innovative alternatives. The socio-technical landscape 
constitutes the wider context, which influences developments on regime and 
niche level; these developments can either be of stabilizing or destabilizing 
nature. The MLP’s main assumption is: A destabilization of the incumbent 
socio-technical regime may come about by mutual reinforcement of (1) grow-
ing landscape pressure, (2) increasing erosion of the incumbent regime, and (3) 
growing competition from niche innovations as they gain importance. 
However, by taking a regime perspective, MLP tends to neglect the mecha-
nisms of action and interaction on each single one of the three levels (and be-
tween them). These mechanisms sustain socio-technical regimes, but may also 
serve as important drivers of change. Furthermore, governance is not a focal 
interest of MLP.  
2.2 Actor-centred approaches 
In order to better understand processes of regime stabilization and destabiliza-
tion, it is necessary to zoom in on the three levels and to take into account the 
actors, their strategies, and negotiation processes in actor networks more de-
tailed. 
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Actor-networks play a crucial role since they are promoters of a socio-technical 
system, which gains its momentum not only due to technical but also based on 
socio-political factors (Tushman and Rosenkopf 1992). This process of the 
social construction of technology has been studied frequently (Bijker et al. 
2012; Pinch and Bijker 1987), putting emphasis on relevant social groups, their 
strategies, (inter-) actions, and negotiations as well as on the socio-political 
dynamics they produce. 
In case of innovation processes, strategic actors from different fields negotiate 
and finally agree on one of the alternatives (“closure”), thus creating the start-
ing point of a technological path. Although this path limits available options, it 
does not totally determine the regime’s course. At certain stages, new alterna-
tives and new actors appear, creating opportunities for a new “closure”, which 
may either sustain the socio-technical regime or trigger change.  
The actor-centred perspective has mostly been applied with the aim to investi-
gate the social construction of socio-technical systems, but only seldom to analyse 
their social de-construction (Turnheim and Geels 2013). 
2.3 Multi-level governance 
Shifting socio-technical systems in order to achieve sustainability is a process 
that typically doesn’t come about by chance, but is a result of deliberate gov-
ernance. Therefore, we have to add a third theoretical element to our model, 
being multi-level governance (MLG). In general, the concept of governance 
reaches beyond traditional government approaches, underlining the increasing 
relevance of non-state actors such as market and civil society actors, who par-
ticipate in policy-making (Van Tulder and Van der Zwart 2005). Additionally, 
MLG is based on the idea of nested levels of governance. Each level has to 
govern itself, i.e. solve coordination processes within the level, but it also (de-
liberately) influences other levels by means of its actions and/or interventions 
(Weyer et al. 2015).1 Policy making thus occurs at different scopes (interna-
tional, national, regional, and local), which interact in a specific way (Bache and 
Flinders 2004) and shape the course of the socio-technical regime. Of course, 
the interplay between national strategies and policies must be taken into ac-
count as well as their interplay with European policies. 
However, multi-level concepts of governance have never been applied to the 
issue of discontinuation before. 
2.4 Towards an integrated conceptual framework 
The idea of multi-level governance of socio-technical regimes refers to all of 
the three aforementioned concepts. 
                                                 
1 In Weyer et al. (2015), we propose an analytical model of multi-level governance, which de-
fines governance as a combination of the basic mechanisms of control and coordination. This 
analytical perspective allows to depict different sample applications, e.g. a multi-level model of 
different levels of policy-making (transnational, national, regional, and local), as in the paper at 
hand. 
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From MLP, it adopts the idea that the socio-technical regime is the core sub-
ject to be investigated when studying social de-construction. Hence, our case 
represents the global automobility regime, to be defined by the following six 
items (cf. Urry 2004; Wells and Nieuwenhuis 2012): 
• Cars that are individually owned and used for flexible, all-purpose and 
long-distance travels; 
• decentralized on-board power stations (internal combustion engines, 
ICE) that rely on fossil fuels; 
• vertically integrated industries that produce cars and develop new tech-
nologies along the existing path; 
• on the part of consumers a strong societal hold of the car, which has a 
specific cultural status; 
• political promotion and protection of the automobility regime by na-
tional governments (e.g. by means of regulation); 
• a legal and technical infrastructure that favours the car and discrimi-
nates other technologies or systems.2 
These six items help to evaluate the issue of regime stability more precisely, as 
formulated in our first working assumption: 
(WA 1) A socio-technical regime may still persist, even if some of its ele-
ments have been challenged. 
The actor network perspective aids to observe more details. In general, the 
main regime actors sustaining and promoting the socio-technical regime of 
automobility are the car industry itself, its suppliers, and supporting national 
policy makers. Therefore, our second working assumption reads as follows: 
(WA 2) The stability of a socio-technical regime is based on a strong actor 
network. 
However, the overall automobility regime is not homogenous but splits up in 
different national sub-regimes, which sustain the global regime, yet have dy-
namics of their own and interact with each other. Zooming in on these nation-
al policy networks helps discovering differences, e.g. between German, French, 
Dutch, or British constellations that are shaped – among others – by the 
strength of the national car manufacturers. 
In order to grasp these sub-regimes, we propose the following working as-
sumption:  
(WA 3) The stability of a socio-technical regime may differ regarding vari-
ous countries. 
Furthermore, we are aware of the fact that actor networks may also appear at 
other levels of the MLP and actors’ actions may not be restricted solely to one 
part of the MLP. Insofar, it seems reasonable to combine MLP and actor-
                                                 
2 Admittedly, cultural status and infrastructure can also be regarded as part of the landscape, 
since both factors support the automobility regime (see Geels 2012: 477). However, they are 
also taken into account as major regime pillars. 
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centred approaches, since the latter may help to identify turning points on so-
cio-technical paths that create an “openness” for change and thus may serve as 
starting points not only for social construction, but also for destabilization and 
social de-construction of a socio-technical regime. Thus, it makes sense to look 
out for actor networks at every level of the MLP: networks creating niches, 
stabilizing the regime, and finally shaping the landscape. For example, transna-
tional organizations, such as the European Union, are candidates for actor 
networks on the landscape level, incorporating a variety of actors who have the 
power to put pressure on the regime. 
Our fourth working assumption emphasises the role of actors in a multi-level 
framework: 
(WA 4) Actors may act at different levels of the MLP, but play different 
roles when acting either as landscape, as regime, or as niche play-
ers.  
Finally, at the niche level, “actors work on radical innovations that deviate 
from existing regimes” (Geels 2012: 472). They are, for instance, amateur pio-
neers, innovative regime actors, or even actors from other sectors (e.g. electric 
utilities, internet companies). Pilot projects, e.g. in urban areas, partly promot-
ed by regional, national, or supranational governments, are the place where 
these actors meet and interact. Even if those local or regional networks are 
rather small and initially unstable, they may gain momentum and challenge the 
current regime (Weyer et al. 1997: 402). 
Referring to these alternatives, our fifth working assumption is: 
(WA 5) Challenging the incumbent regime requires a competing actor net-
work (with the vision of a new socio-technical regime). 
Finally, the multi-level governance perspective helps to understand the interre-
latedness of governance activities at different levels, be it either transnational – 
national – regional – local, or landscape – regime – niche. We assume that 
some actors (e.g. politicians) perform actions in order to steer an external sys-
tem (e.g. transportation) into a desired direction (e.g. sustainability). They do so 
by shaping the boundary conditions of other actors acting either at the same or 
at another level and thus create incentives making desired outcomes more fea-
sible (c.f. Weyer et al. 2015). 
Our final working assumption aims at these theoretical implications: 
(WA 6) Actors at each level try to influence and to control each other and 
thus intentionally shape other parts of the multi-level structure in 
order to promote the continuation or discontinuation of a socio-
technical regime. 
In the following, we will apply the concept of multi-level governance of socio-
technical regimes – at least partially – to the case of discontinuation of the au-
tomobility regime. Additionally, the case study shall help finding a way to 
streamline our model. We assume that at least parts of the three concepts can 
be integrated in a way that facilitates the multi-level model’s use. 
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3 Discontinuation policies to overcome the  
automobility regime 
The following Section describes and analyses the transport and environment 
policies in the four aforementioned countries and on the EU-level – especially 
regarding political attempts to foster a sustainable mobility by displacing the 
dominant automobility regime. In principle, the following three starting points 
to promote change can be identified: 
1. Restrictions of use, e.g. by means of road pricing, car tolls, or spatial 
planning (mostly national or local), or by means of regulation, e.g. of 
CO2 emissions (mostly supranational), i.e. measures that aim at stimu-
lating sustainable mobility and thus challenge the incumbent regime; 
2. Promotion of alternative mobility patterns like modal shift, public 
transport, or car sharing (mostly national or local), i.e. measures that 
mainly promote niche innovations, but also indirectly affect the regime; 
3. Promotion of alternative drive technologies, e.g. the electric vehicle by 
means of financing R&D, pilot projects, or investing in infrastructure 
(at different levels), i.e. measures heading for niche innovations yet also 
indirectly affecting the regime. 
In the following, we will focus on the first type of measures, which is directly 
and purposefully restricting the use of cars, while neglecting the other two 
types, which challenge the incumbent regime only indirectly by promoting al-
ternative options. 
3.1 Methodology 
The case study at hand draws primarily on document analysis: Data was col-
lected from publications by scientists, interest groups, municipalities, and (su-
pra-)national governments. Additionally, we conducted interviews with aca-
demic, political, industrial, and societal actors to gain a better understanding of 
prevalent actor strategies and constellations. To cover a wide range of actors, 
interview partners who act outside the dominant automobility regime were 
selected as well, for instance representatives of the civil society or social 
movements. 
3.2 Policy-making at EU-level 
During the last two decades, actors on the EU level increasingly started to 
challenge the socio-technical regime of automobility.3 Subsequently, we will 
analyse EU regulation on CO2 emissions (Section 3.2.1) and its strategic 
roadmaps towards sustainable mobility (Section 3.2.2).  
                                                 
3 For a detailed description of the development and regulation activities including the regula-
tion on noxious vehicle emissions by the so-called EURO norms, see Wagner (2011: 58f). 
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3.2.1 EU regulation on CO2 emissions 
The 1990s mark the beginning of the EU’s regulation on environmental issues, 
partly triggered by the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations 1998), which had, 
among others, also raised the public awareness of ecological consequences of 
transport. Afterwards, the Kyoto protocol became a major reference point for 
EU activities in climate policy, and in other sectors as well. Prior to this, most 
measures, e.g. on fuel consumption of cars, had primarily been initiated by 
national governments for economic reasons (Wells et al. 2013: 32). 
The European Union’s explicit attempts to influence the use of cars with com-
bustion engines started in 1995 with the European “Community Strategy to 
Reduce CO2 Emissions from Passenger Cars and Improve Fuel Economy”, 
which demanded measures for “reducing the use of motor vehicles, influencing 
driving behaviour (e.g. speed) and achieving a higher vehicle fuel efficiency by 
a combination of technical and non-technical measures” (European 
Commission 1995: 3). Additionally, it called for “an encompassing strategy 
[including] the improvement of public transport within an overall plan for inter-
modality and the promotion of a modal shift towards public and non-motorised means 
of transportation […]” (European Commission 1995: 3; emphasis added). 
The next step was a voluntary agreement (VA) between the European Car 
Manufacturer Association (ACEA) and the EU, through which the automobile 
industry committed to an average emission target of 140g CO2/km until 2008; 
furthermore, the EU demanded an intermediate target of 165-170g by 2003 
and held out the prospect of 120g by 2012. The VA had been negotiated since 
1997 and was finally acknowledged by the European Commission in 1999.  
Due to different product portfolios and hence different positions on the sub-
ject of emission reduction, the ACEA was basically divided into two “camps“: 
the manufacturers of big, premium vehicles (headed by Germany) and the 
manufacturers of small vehicles (headed by France and Italy), either of which 
were supported by their respective national governments (Wagner 2011: 176, 
177). Since the fulfilment of strict CO2 limits was especially challenging to the 
former, they resisted the most. However, during the negotiation process of the 
VA, the members of the ACEA managed to act in a unified way (in spite of 
their internal differences) – mainly by taking a “lowest common denominator 
position” in order to avoid binding legislations by the EU (ibid.). 
For the purpose of transparency, the progress of the ACEA’s commitment was 
monitored annually by the European Commission (European Commission 
2004: 4). Although the automobile industry was initially able to make substan-
tial progress regarding the realisation of the targets (and thus fulfilling their 
commitment for 2003), further developments came to a halt between 2004 and 
2006, when average exhausts levelled off at around 160g CO2/km. Hence, the 
European Commission’s perception of ACEA’s progress shifted considerably 
from 2004 to 2007: While the 2004 report stated that the industry made “good 
progress” (European Commission 2004: 20), reports after 2006 stressed 
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“growing concerns” and the Commission’s “readiness to consider all measures, 
including legislative ones” (European Commission 2006a: 3; 2007c: 5). Conse-
quently – and even though the ACEA “delivered a sizeable contribution to the 
EU strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and to its Kyoto reduction 
objectives” (European Commission 2006a: 8) – the VA had “not worked as 
well as had been hoped”, and the European Commission declared it as a failure 
(European Commission 2007b: 6).  
Although the emission targets within the VA lack ambition and represent a 
setback in comparison to the initial EU target (120g CO2/km by 2005), for the 
first time the car industry agreed on voluntary emission reductions, preparing 
the industry for a binding legislation. Nevertheless, neither the European Par-
liament nor the European Council nor civil society actors (e.g. environmental 
NGOs) have been involved in the negotiation process of the agreement 
(Dalkmann et al. 2005: 25). 
After the failed VA, the European Commission began to work on a draft for a 
legally binding CO2 limit. This time, conflicts within European Commission 
emerged, when two Directorates General, namely DG Environment and DG 
Enterprise & Industry, worked in parallel on draft regulations, and both intro-
duced them in February 2007 (European Commission 2007a, 2007c). Although 
DG Environment was officially responsible, DG Enterprise and Industry 
managed to include an “integrated approach”, which had been developed by 
stakeholders from the European automotive sector, into the final proposal 
(European Commission 2007a: 9-12).  
This was heavily disputed by the DG Environment and environmental NGOs 
for watering down binding targets (Deters 2010: 25).  
Difficulties in finding uniform standards were not only sharpened by the dis-
cord within the European Commission, but also by the disunity between the 
EU member states, especially between Germany, France and Italy – basically 
representing the interests of the two industry camps within the ACEA. They 
had fierce debates, the main issue of which was the appropriate slope of the 
emission value curve: A high one would force manufacturers of small vehicles 
to enhance efficiency (mainly Italy and France), while a low slope would re-
quire improving large premium vehicles (mainly in Germany) (Deters 2010: 
26). Each national government demanded slopes that favoured their national 
automotive industry, forming two opposing actor coalitions of national gov-
ernments and national industries. In contrast, environmental NGOs acted in 
unison, demanding a 95g/km-target.4  
For some time, the bargaining processes remained deadlocked, until the stale-
mate was overpassed by a bilateral agreement between France and Germany, 
which mostly corresponded to German interests (ibid.: 23) and thus demon-
strated the role of Germany as an agenda setting force. This arrangement was 
                                                 
4 Interviews with environmental NGOs (NGO1, 1:11:46 - 1:15:48 and NGO2, 00:16:05 - 
00:16:41). 
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pushed through the approval processes at the EU Council and finally adopted 
by the EU Parliament as Regulation 443/2009. 
In sum, compared to the Community Strategy of 1995, this regulation repre-
sents a setback (regarding dedicated discontinuation governance), since it relies 
more on innovation policies (European Union 2009: 1f) than on restricting the 
use of fossil-fuelled cars. 
Recent negotiations about the revision of Regulation 443/2009 underline the 
important role of Germany. In 2013, Germany resisted to a tightening of limits 
and thus delayed progress again, but then started bilateral discussions with oth-
er member states and enforced an informal agreement within the European 
Parliament (European Council 2013). This encompassed a major concession 
for the automotive industry (in form of a limited one-year phase-in period for 
the new target of 95g CO2/km), which again provoked severe negative reac-
tions, especially on the part of environmental associations (like the German 
DUH and VCD) and the German Green Party.  
3.2.2 Strategic roadmaps towards sustainable mobility 
Besides regulating the automotive industry and the use of cars, the EU has also 
been proposing roadmaps to achieve an eco-friendly and sustainable mobility 
for about 20 years.  
In 1992, the “Green Paper” of the DG Transport and DG Environment (c.f. 
European Commission 1992: 28, 36, 55) promoted a modal shift to cope with 
environmental issues of the transport sector on the one hand and the expected 
impact of European market integration5 on the other hand. In 2001, the White 
Paper “European Transport Policy for 2010” demanded to counter the “une-
qual growth in the different modes of transport“ and to draw on an integrated 
transport policy guided by “a new imperative – sustainable development” 
(European Commission 2001: 7, 9). However, compared to the preceding 
“Green Paper”, it was less restrictive regarding road transport, but focussed on 
the promotion of other modes of transport instead (European Commission 
2001: 11). The “White Paper” mainly proposed pricing measures and infra-
structure investments, wherefore it received negative feedback from environ-
mental as well as from industrial associations (EurActiv 2001).  
Its 2006 revision put stronger emphasis on solutions for urban transportation 
and suggested to shift responsibility for the development of sustainable 
measures to urban administrative authorities (European Commission 2006b: 
14). Furthermore, the EU committed itself to promote various low-carbon 
propulsion technologies. The approach again resembled innovation policy ra-
ther than deliberate discontinuation policy. 
                                                 
5 The presumed increase in economic activity (e.g. due to the creation of the European Eco-
nomic Area) was expected to lead to a boost in transport demand (European Commission 
1992: 36). Hence, a shift towards sustainable transport sectors with excess capacities was pro-
moted (e.g. from private car to public transport). 
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Early in 2011, the “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area” (European 
Commission 2011b)6 was put into place. Again, its objective was a sustainable 
transformation of the transportation system, gained by reducing dependency 
on oil, decreasing greenhouse-gases, and creating a modern infrastructure and 
multimodal mobility (ibid.: 3f). In contrast to its predecessors, targets for the 
phase-out of cars with conventional ICE were set: The use of fossil-fuelled 
passenger cars in cities was ought to be halved by 2030 and phased out entirely 
by 2050. So far, this had been the first (and sole) document of EU regulation 
dedicatedly demanding for a discontinuation of automobility.  
Concerning measures, the roadmap states, “curbing mobility is not an option”, 
and proposes to accompany the phase-out of ICE-based cars via the fostering 
of new drive technologies (ibid.: 5) instead. In addition, it suggests to charge 
users and polluters for external costs (environmental and social ones) and to 
terminate “harmful subsidies” in order to generate revenues and ensure financ-
ing for future investments in transportation (ibid.: 14). 
The 2011 edition of the White Paper triggered mixed responses across differ-
ent states and organisations: Although many principally appreciated it for 
pointing in the right direction (e.g. the European Cyclists’ Federation, the As-
sociation of European Metropolitan Transport Authorities, and the German 
Green Party), the document was predominantly criticised for its lack of preci-
sion, ambition, and feasibility7 (e.g. by the international NGO association 
“Transport and Environment”, Greenpeace, and the British Independence 
Party), the neglect of co-modality (e.g. by ACEA and the International Road 
Transport Union), and the absence of specific financial schemes (e.g. by the 
German Federal Assembly).  
3.2.3 Interim conclusion: Discontinuation policy on the EU level 
In recent years, the EU has become a powerful actor in regard to sustainable 
transport policies, being the first one to demand a phase-out of conventionally 
fuelled cars on the urban level. In doing so, the EU has increasingly put pres-
sure on national regime actors and hence forced them to act. 
However, the analysis of policy processes and relevant actor constellations 
reveals a strong opposition by industrial actors who were able to influence de-
cision processes despite sector-internal discord. They drew on the support of 
national governments that bypassed formal regulation procedures by informal 
agreements. Thus, the industry was able to cope with required limits by draw-
ing on incremental solutions, such as optimizing the ICE-based car, e.g. by 
means of “hybridization” (Wells and Nieuwenhuis 2012: 1686). The EU’s regu-
lative measures did not end up in shifting the automobility regime (Dijk and 
Kemp 2012: 54). However, its actions have opened a window of opportunity 
that may weaken the incumbent regime in the long run. 
                                                 
6 It was complemented by an “Impact Assessment” (European Commission 2011a), suggesting 
concrete targets, scenarios, and policy measures. 
7 Interview environmental NGO (NGO1, 00:12:16 - 00:17:17). 
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Analysing these developments from the perspective of MLP, we can observe a 
dual role of politics: Supranational institutions exert landscape pressure on the 
regime (e.g. by setting up CO2 regulation), what forces regime actors to take 
action, or – as one of our interviewees puts it – “gets the member states to 
move on”.8 National politics can be regarded as a mean pillar of different na-
tional sub-regimes of automobility, being influenced by this kind of landscape 
pressure. However, national politics is also part of the negotiation processes 
and decision-making at EU level, even when acting as lobbyists from national 
industries. This way, it is also able to shape the landscape, thus taking a dual 
role as regime and landscape actor simultaneously. 
3.3 National and local policies 
Supranational transport policies typically are adjusted to specific national con-
texts by means of national and local policy measures. In the following, we will 
take a closer look at transport policy on these two levels, especially pro-
grammes for sustainable mobility (3.3.1), spatial restrictions, and road charging 
(3.3.2). By this means we will try to identify attempts that challenge the incum-
bent automobility regime. 
3.3.1 National and urban transport plans for sustainable mobility 
National programmes fostering sustainable mobility and modal share came up 
in the 1990s, at the same time as supranational environmental policymaking did 
(see also Figure 1).  
The Dutch “Second Traffic and Transport Structure Scheme” (SVV2) from 
1990 (to 2001) sought to combine environmental and spatial planning objec-
tives with transport sector development goals and promoted the proliferation 
of clean, safe, and efficient vehicles (TKdSG 1990). In the UK, “A New Deal 
for Transport” (DTR 1998) launched strategies for sustainable mobility in 1997 
and therewith ended the government’s large-scale road building strategy. Fur-
thermore, both national traffic development plans fostered the idea of modal 
shift via improving alternatives to the private car, like public transport and 
cycling facilities for instance. The necessary investments were to be funded by 
a newly created infrastructure fund, filled out of revenues such as the motor 
vehicle tax or the motor fuel tax. But in contrast to the “New Deal”, the SVV2 
also pushed the idea of restricting mobility by reducing the number of kilome-
tres travelled and by promoting a selective accessibility to roads (e.g. through 
limiting vehicle access). Hence, since the 1990s, Dutch traffic policies have not 
been taking car use for granted anymore (Schot et al. 1994: 1071). 
Tendencies to impede individual car use can be found in Dutch policymaking 
regarding mobility to date. For example, the Dutch national research institute 
for mobility suggests to curb the demand for mobility (e.g. by improving con-
ditions for home working) and to support a modal shift (Moorman and 
Kansen 2011: 5). The institute also opts for the introduction and subsidisation 
                                                 
8 Interview with Member of German Federal Parliament (MDB1, 00:17:48). 
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of a variety of low carbon technologies, which should be made more competi-
tive by the promotion of an emission reduction policy.  
In the UK as well as in the Netherlands, the introduction of traffic develop-
ment plans was accompanied by tendencies of decentralization. In the Nether-
lands, the VERDI accord (“Traffic and transport: regional, decentralized and 
integral”) was established in 1996 to foster the scope for local initiatives and to 
transfer responsibility for transport aspects, spatial planning, etc. to local au-
thorities (MVW 1996). In the UK, the so-called “devolution transition” did the 
same by urging local authorities to produce five-year plans for transportation 
and to describe strategies to achieve an integrated transport system. In 2000, 
the decentralization process received a legal basis by through the Transport 
Act (HMG 2000), which permitted local authorities to introduce ‘road user 
charging’ or ‘workplace parking charge’ schemes as part of an integrated 
transport system.  
However, especially in the UK, the economic and political resources to pro-
mote sustainable mobility were lacking at the local level, and a consensus about 
strategies and proceedings was missing. Additionally, public acceptance for 
sustainable mobility plans was lacking: The fuel protests in 2000, for instance, 
illustrated the public’s strong dependency on fossil-fuelled automobility. Alto-
gether, the decentralization process did not work as a lever for sustainable mo-
bility. 
In 2008, the UK’s government issued the first (and only) legal obligation in a 
European member state to meet CO2 reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol: 
The Climate Change Act (CCA) demanded an 80% reduction of net carbon 
account for all greenhouse gases in 2050 in comparison to 1990. However, the 
strategies to accomplish these emission goals were ambivalent regarding the 
reduction of car-usage. The British Department for Transport argued that en-
ergy efficiency “will primarily be delivered through advances in the efficiency 
of the internal combustion engine. Alongside this, new ultra-low emission ve-
hicles will be available on the mass-market.“ (DfT 2009: 38) On the other 
hand, the department advices local authorities to „use parking policies along-
side other planning and transport measures to promote sustainable transport 
choices and reduce reliance on the car“ (ibid.: 11) – thus partly promoting (im-
proved) cars, partly trying to restrict their use. 
Since the early 1980s, France has been pursuing a similar strategy to foster sus-
tainable transport via urban mobility plans (“Plan de déplacements urbains”, 
PDUs). The French Air Quality and Rational Use of Energy Act (“Loi sur l’air 
et l’utilisation rationelle de l’energie”, LAURE) from 1996 made those plans 
compulsory for urban areas with over 100.000 inhabitants (Assemblée 
Nationale 1996), in 2005 even for medium-sized towns. A few years later, they 
became legally binding. Urban mobility plans should support the reduction of 
car traffic (Art. 28-1) and promote the development of public transport, less 
pollutant vehicles, and of active transport modes (Art. 28-2). As in 2013, 80 
PDUs had been established (CERTU 2013: 1). This was partly due to recent 
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EU regulations on CO2 emissions that encouraged and legitimized national 
transportation policy referring to climate change. 
The French 2010 environment protection law „Grenelle II“ (Assemblée 
Nationale 2010) provided the legal foundation for “public transport on sepa-
rate lanes” (“Transport en commun en site propre” - TCSP ), which sought to 
enhance the quality of public transport and simultaneously reduce the space for 
cars (e.g. by building railway lines on former roads). This represented a new 
quality of political regulation, since the TSCP plan contained the deliberate 
purpose to restrict and discontinue passenger car use through strong measures.  
In sum, we could find several activities in the area of transport and environ-
ment policy during the past two decades that enhance sustainable mobility and 
(at least partly) challenge the dominant regime, e.g. by changing infrastructural 
conditions, which may affect deeply entrenched car-user behaviour. In all three 
countries, transportation policy heading for sustainable mobility was accompa-
nied by a process of decentralisation, shifting responsibilities to local (resp. 
urban) levels. 
Germany was lagging behind in terms of eco-friendly transport policies (or 
even shifting the automobility regime) and initiatives fostering the reduction of 
car use were mainly absent (exceptions being low-emission zones, see follow-
ing chapter). Due to the strong support of the car (by consumers), the re-
striction of car usage is deemed as “political suicide”9 and a “topic of out-
rage”.10 In contrary, as a reaction to the global financial crisis in 2008, the 
German (and the British) government subsidized the purchase of new cars – 
be it a low or a high polluting car – by environmental bonuses such as the 
scrappage scheme. “Carefully constructed narratives about the need to reduce 
dependence on the car were sacrificed at the altar of short-term economic sta-
bility and increasing car production and sales.” (Docherty and Shaw 2012: 111).  
3.3.2 Spatial restrictions and road charging 
Spatial restrictions and road charging represent the second type of policy 
measures constraining automobility to be investigated here. One well-known 
example is the urban congestion charging in London, which was legally ena-
bled by the afore-mentioned Transportation Act and a corresponding EU leg-
islation in 2003. This road toll had been introduced to overcome the gridlock 
in London City by promoting a modal shift from individual cars to public 
transport. Although electric vehicles were not affected by the charge, it had not 
been conceived of as a means of deliberately facilitating sustainable mobility, 
but primarily as a tool to avoid traffic jams and raise new funds to finance the 
road infrastructure (Erdmenger 2010: 16f). 
                                                 
9 Interview with Mobility Researcher MR1, 01:04:16. 
10 Interview with Member of German Federal Parliament MDB1, 00:35:28. 
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The London example is considered to be a success. However, almost no other 
city in the UK introduced congestion charging. In Edinburgh and Manchester, 
introduction proposals were even rejected.  
In France, car tolls on motorways have already been implemented in 1955 as a 
means to finance road maintenance and thus support the automobility regime. 
In Germany, attempts to introduce road charging have been pushed likewise 
by strategies to raise money for maintaining the road network. The introduc-
tion of a car toll is currently part of the bargaining process between different 
political parties, because it has been – despite severe differences – registered in 
the coalition agreement in 2013. Concepts for road fees issued by the Minister 
of Transport are heavily criticised by automobile associations.11 In the Nether-
lands, the long debate on road pricing (especially in terms of congestion charg-
ing) was even discontinued by the coalition agreement of the actual govern-
ment (Geels et al. 2012: 359). 
Another approach to restrict the car use is to ban them from cities via „low-
emission zones“. As the term already indicates, this measure has been legiti-
mised by environmental motives, i.e. reducing particular emissions in cities, as 
in the case of Germany in 2008.  Hence, the environmental zones were strong-
ly supported by German NGOs.12 However, most cars attain the entry allow-
ance and pollution monitoring is insufficient, with lacking consequences of 
exceeding limits.13 Therefore, NGOs now prompt for stronger standards.14 
In France, the introduction of “Zones d’Actions Prioritaires pour l’Air” (ZA-
PA) started with a (heavily discussed) three-years test in 2012, implementing 
seven ZAPAs in Paris, Grenoble, Lyon, Aix-en-Provence, Bordeaux, and two 
other cities. With this measure, the French ministry of environment reacted to 
EU legislation of 2008, since the country had been unable to meet the limits of 
particular matters (PM10). Once more, this emphasises the influence of EU 
regulation on national politics when it comes to restraining automobility. 
  
                                                 
11 Interviews at Ecologic Automobile Association (EAA1, 00:19:54 - 00:21:58) and at Auto-
mobile Association (AA1, 00:04.12 - 00:05:11). 
12 Interview environmental NGO (NGO1, 01:16:27 - 1:27:27). 
13 Interview with Member of German Federal Parliament (MDB1, 00:46:20- 00:47:28). 
14 Interview environmental NGO (NGO2, 00:49:27 - 00:51:20). 
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3.3.3 Interim conclusion: Discontinuation on national and local levels 
In sum, we were able to find various national and local policies regarding sus-
tainable transport, resulting in a patchwork that does only allow for identifying 
some tentative patterns (see Figure 1): 
(a) The early 1990s were the starting point for supranational activities in 
the EU and the UN aiming at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In-
ternational agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol, triggered national 
programs, which supported sustainable mobility for the first time, but 
did not challenge the incumbent regime at all. 
(b) Those countries that fostered sustainable mobility in the late 1990s also 
encouraged decentralization, and shifted responsibilities to the local 
level. However, with some exceptions (such as the Dutch SVV2 or the 
French TSCP), we could hardly find any deliberate attempt to challenge 
the dominant automobility regime. National policies rather continued 
to support it (especially the UK and Germany). 
(c) National and local policies in the late 1990s and early 2000s have in-
creasingly been influenced by EU regulations, which served as a source 
of legitimacy for measures concerning transportation. 
(d) Despite various local programs for spatial restrictions or road charging 
in this phase, an integrated approach has neither emerged on the nation 
state nor on the EU level. All measures mentioned above remained iso-
lated policy instruments and did not “add up” to seriously challenge the 
automobility regime. On the contrary: Road charging is usually not 
used to impede automobility but as an instrument to finance the road 
infrastructure and thus support the regime. 
(e) Since the mid-2000s, the EU has started a “new wave” of activities, 
such as the CO2 regulation and the “Roadmap Towards a Single Euro-
pean Transport Aera”, which put increasing pressure on national gov-
ernments and automobile manufacturers to comply with climate policy 
objectives. This has created a window of opportunity for challenging 
the regime, but no compelling force that might trigger regime change in 
due course. 
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Figure 1: Timeline of discontinuation policies at local, national and supranational levels 
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4 Examination of working assumptions 
Empirically, we found strong indicators that the perception of the automobile 
shifted during the last decades from being a solution for economic problems to 
a policy problem. Hence, evidences point to some changes in the landscape of 
the socio-technical automobility regime. However, although generally promot-
ing sustainable mobility, most political initiatives have not challenged the in-
cumbent regime of conventionally fuelled cars by forcing its discontinuation. 
In the following, we will review the three theoretical concepts, and check if 
they helped confirming our working assumptions. Furthermore, we will discuss 
our findings in the broader context of research on (auto-) mobility transitions 
(which will partially exceed our policy-focussed study). 
4.1 Multi-level perspective (MLP) 
4.1.1 Regime 
Our analysis of attempts to deliberately destabilize the automobility-regime has 
shown that the regime’s stability is constituted by several components – basi-
cally confirming other authors’ studies (see Geels 2012; Urry 2004; Wells and 
Nieuwenhuis 2012). Especially the analysis of the CO2 regulation illustrates the 
automotive industry's crucial role in many national economies. Due to this 
critical economical and social embedding, it enjoys a privileged status in terms 
of political agendas and represents a powerful lobby (Wells and Nieuwenhuis 
2012: 1686). 
The automobility regime is furthermore based on a powerful business model, 
which encompasses high sunk costs and allows mass production due to econ-
omies of scale – both substantial boosters of path-dependency. This consti-
tutes significant barriers for new market entrants and technological alternatives. 
Additionally, the concept of the car has a strong societal hold. “Public’s love 
affair with the motor car” (Financial Times, 2000, 29th September) is based on 
consumption routines that rely on flexible (auto-) mobility.  
As indicated, the socio-technical regime of the automobile is based on a strong 
actor network of the automobile industry (and associated sectors), transporta-
tion policy, and customer behaviour, which mutually reinforce each other and 
create path dependency. Hence, the automobility regime is able to generate and 
reproduce a “specific character of domination” (Urry 2004: 25). These stabilis-
ing and continuous features may even lead to a “transition failure” (Wells and 
Nieuwenhuis 2012). 
(WA 2) Our working assumption: “The stability of a socio-technical re-
gime is based on a strong actor network” can thus be confirmed. 
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4.1.2 Contested elements of the regime 
Nevertheless, when also taking the broader context of research on mobility-
transitions into account, at least some regime elements have been contested in 
the past:15 
• Several patterns of modal share or alternative mobility seem to threaten 
– at least in some parts of society, e.g. in urban districts – the concept 
of the individually owned and used car for flexible, all-purpose, and 
long-distance travels; 
• Alternative propulsion technologies, such as the electric vehicle* chal-
lenge the dominant internal combustion engine due to climate noxious 
effects; 
• New players* from other business sectors (dotcom firms or energy 
companies) have entered the market and challenged the incumbent 
business model of the automotive industry; 
• At least some fractions of consumers (especially in urban areas*) do no 
longer attribute the car a privileged cultural status to; 
• The dominant pattern of political protection of the automobility re-
gime has been challenged by climate policy measures, especially on part 
of the EU, which call for a fundamental transformation of transporta-
tion; 
• Finally, the traditional strategy of extensive infrastructural growth 
(building roads) has come to an end and has been replaced by a strate-
gy of intensive growth, relying on smart devices and a smart network 
management* – they principally can also be used to promote multi-
modal services that do not solely rely on the car. 
However, these six separate trends do not “add up” to a regime change yet. 
(WA 1) Hence, our working assumption: “A socio-technical regime 
may still persist even if some of its elements have been challenged”, can 
also be confirmed. 
The next subsections will show that neither landscape pressure nor niche de-
velopments are strong enough to put pressure on the regime to possibly trigger 
change. 
4.1.3 Landscape 
Various stabilizing and destabilizing landscape developments can be distin-
guished regarding the transition of automobility. The existing road infrastruc-
ture as well as the increasing demand for mobility both represent landscape 
influences that tend to stabilize the socio-technical regime of automobility with 
its core component of the fossil-fuelled car (Geels 2012: 478). On the other 
hand, as depicted in our case study, the growing public awareness and political 
                                                 
15 The asterisks mark those elements, which have not been investigated in our case study in 
detail. 
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discourses concerning environmental issues such as climate change (partly at 
supranational levels, e.g. the European Union) can be regarded as destabilizing 
landscape pressures. This also applies to economic developments and pres-
sures like scarcity of fossil fuels or the necessity to obtain national competi-
tiveness regarding new technologies and markets. 
4.1.4 Niches 
Although not investigated in detail in this paper, we were able to find a large 
variety of niche innovations like alternative drive-technologies (e.g. electric 
vehicles) and new mobility patterns in the (automotive) transport system 
(Geels 2012: 457 ff; Nilsson et al. 2012). These innovations are promoted part-
ly by amateur outsiders who, for instance, construct their own solar vehicle and 
partly by regime actors who conduct large demonstration projects with car 
sharing for instance (like Daimler’s Car2Go). Additionally, new actors from 
other industrial sectors, such as Tesla or Google, step in and create new visions 
concerning the future automobile. In some cases, public authorities have fund-
ed showcase projects as “protected spaces”, where the niche innovation can 
prove its performance. Other examples underline the relevance of EU funds as 
being important means of promoting new options and encouraging experi-
ments with alternative mobility patterns.  
4.2 Actor networks 
As already discussed in Section 4.1, the (international) actor network of auto-
mobility is still strong enough to sustain the regime and to cope with any kind 
of disturbances, even with current challenges through climate policy (WA 2). 
Zooming in on the interaction processes within these networks reveals interest 
conflicts not only between different parties but also within them, e.g. within 
the group of industrial actors or between different governments. These interest 
conflicts have fundamentally influenced the governance processes fundamen-
tally. Especially the EU’s increasing influence can be related to the disaccord of 
the European automotive companies who weakened the negotiation power of 
industrial actors. 
However, national actor constellations differ remarkably, as our comparison of 
four countries revealed. The existence of a national automobile industry, as in 
France and Germany) obviously matters, compared to the Netherlands and 
Great Britain, which both lack big national companies and thus do not have 
relevant stakeholders in this sector. 
The analysis of actor constellations provided an explanation of why the four 
countries reacted differently vis-à-vis climate change challenges and promoted 
various kinds of alternatives (cf. Section 3.3). We could observe different na-
tional pathways of continuation and/or transformation of the automobility 
regime – even if somehow ambivalent. 
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(WA 3) There is some evidence that our third working assumption: 
“The stability of a socio-technical regime may differ regarding various 
countries”, can be confirmed. 
However, alternative visions of mobility that really might challenge the incum-
bent regime are rather rare. There is a huge number of initiatives in different 
fields (e.g. electric mobility). But, surprisingly, we did not find any hint to a 
new actor network that could emerge as a rival in near future – neither in the 
niches nor in the visions of the environmental NGOs. 
(WA 5) Our fifth working assumption: “Challenging the incumbent re-
gime requires a competing actor network” can thus be confirmed, too. 
4.3 Multi-level Governance 
In the case of the socio-technical regime of automobility, governance activities 
occur at different levels: in national policy making, at the European Union 
level, which has become an important actor during the last decades, and, final-
ly, in regions and cities that experiment with different approaches of regulating 
the automobile or promoting alternative modes of transport. Hence, the inter-
actions between different levels of the multi-level governance system are rele-
vant, e.g. when European regulation affects national transportation policy or 
when European funding promotes local experiments with alternatives. Actors 
mutually influence each other, since actions at one level change the boundary 
conditions of the actors at another level and vice versa, thus producing a hardly 
controllable dynamic. 
(WA 6) There is at least some evidence for the validity of the working 
assumption: “Actors at each level try to influence and to control one 
another and thus intentionally shape other parts of the multi-level 
structure in order to promote the continuation or discontinuation of a 
socio-technical regime.” 
The case study provides ample evidence on the assumption that policy making 
occurs within a nested set of governance layers: international, national, regional 
and local. Actors aiming at discontinuing the automobility regime act at differ-
ent levels, ranging from negotiations and regulations on the supranational level 
to national policies, urban spatial planning, and regional pilot schemes. By 
means of scarcely coordinated measures they created a vast and widespread 
patchwork of discontinuation policy in Europe (cf. Figure 1). 
Furthermore, network memberships are partly overlapping with actors playing 
different roles at different levels. Regarding policy makers, for example actors 
sustaining the national regime, may also be part of the transnational govern-
ance processes that are pursuing the objective of sustainable mobility much 
more fiercely than national politics (see for instance Germany’s dual role in 
CO2 regulation). 
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(WA 4) Our fourth working assumption: “Actors may act at different 
levels of the MLP, but play different roles when acting either as land-
scape, as regime, or as niche players” can thus be confirmed as well. 
European policy makers are much more active concerning sustainable 
transport policies than their national and local colleagues (Geels 2012: 478). 
We could only find weak indicators that the discontinuation of the ICE-based 
car is being promoted by national governments (remarkable exceptions are the 
TSCP in France and the SVV2 in the Netherlands).  
5 An integrated approach  
One objective of this paper was to demonstrate the value of an integrated ap-
proach, combining the multi-level perspective (MLP) of socio-technical 
change, the actor network approach, and the concept of multi-level governance 
(MLG). We can conclude that these three concepts obviously work well to-
gether and do not produce any inconsistencies, e.g. in terminology. 
5.1.1 Combing MLP and actor-centred approaches 
The actor network approach rather enriches the multi-level perspective and 
helps to better understand the negotiation processes at all of the three levels, as 
well as the interactions between them. Indeed, we conceptualized levels more 
concrete and actor-specific as originally intended by the founders of MLP. 
5.1.2 Combining MLP and MLG 
But the question remains whether we need two multi-level frameworks and - if 
so - whether they can be smoothly integrated. MLG leads to a deeper insight 
into the interaction between landscape, regime and niches. MLP conceptualizes 
at least landscape and regime as rather anaemic entities: They emerge, develop, 
and influence each other, but seem to have a life of their own, since internal 
dynamics are mostly disregarded. MLG is able to fill this gap through empha-
sising actors and actor networks, which deliberately try to control each other 
by affecting the boundary conditions of one another (at different levels). 
Combining MLP and MLG therefore leads to the most surprising result of our 
analysis: It is mainly actors at the supranational level who exert landscape pres-
sure on the automobility regime. As our case study shows, the influence of the 
EU has remarkably increased over the last years: It has become the most im-
portant player prompting towards the discontinuation of the socio-technical 
regime of automobility. Windows of opportunity have mainly been opened by 
policymaking at the supranational level, like in the case of CO2 regulation. Fur-
thermore, this landscape pressure is not a vague and diffuse occurrence, but 
has been constructed rather deliberately. 
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In order to grasp how this landscape pressure emerged, actor network ap-
proaches reveal further details of the decision-making processes at the EU 
level and provide an explanation for the emergence and specific shape of land-
scape pressure. The case of CO2 regulation illustrates how regime actors have 
influenced the landscape (e.g. via lobbyism) and have also tried to absorb land-
scape pressure (e.g. by incremental changes of the incumbent technology, 
which did not endanger the regime). 
5.1.3 One single framework? 
Complementing MLP with the concept of actor networks leads to a more sub-
stantial notion of levels, conceptualising them no longer as amorphous entities, 
but as places or spaces where actors (inter-)act and thus create and shape reali-
ty, instead. In doing so, MLP and MLG levels converge to an extent that al-
lows to integrate these two frameworks at least partly. Our case study demon-
strates: 
• Destabilizing landscape pressure is mainly constructed (and exerted) by 
international players such as the UN or the EU (even if national actors 
are part of the game). 
• The regime has a strong national hold, especially within politics and in-
dustry (even if manufacturers operate globally). 
• Niches typically are regional or local spaces where a variety of players 
act and interact, ranging from cities reorganising urban transport (e.g. 
London) over local activists, outsiders and tinkerers, to regime players 
(e.g. Daimler) and landscape players as well (e.g. the EU, funding alter-
native mobility experiments). 
Even if this may not apply to other cases, at least in ours, the two multi-level 
frameworks can be integrated to a single concept of an actor-centred multi-
level governance of socio-technical systems.  
5.1.4 Governance of complex systems 
This actor-centred, multi-level approach also allows considering the discontin-
uation of the socio-technical regime of automobility as a sample of governance 
of complex systems. In contrast to other cases such as DDT or the electric 
light bulb, which both have been banned by multinational institutions 
(Stegmaier et al. 2014), there is neither a common vision nor concerted actions 
nor coordinated control which would endanger the automobility regime. 
We rather see multiple actors pursuing a variety of strategies while playing dif-
ferent games at various levels, mutually influencing each other in a way that 
impedes predicting the outcome. However, the integrated actor-centred, multi-
level approach helps to analyse these complex processes better than one of the 
three approaches on its own. 
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6 Limitations and further perspectives 
Until now, our integrated approach combining different analytical concepts has 
so far only been tested through one explorative case study. Hence, the question 
of its transferability to other cases remains unresolved. Furthermore, the paper 
at hand puts emphasis on only some elements of the regime and does not fur-
ther investigate e.g. cultural change or smart infrastructures as factors challeng-
ing the regime. 
Further research should also analyse actor constellations and developments 
within the niche(s) more in-depth. This might help answering questions of 
whether new actors (from civil society, NGOs, dotcoms and/or the energy 
sector) are entering the stage and whether new actor networks are emerging, 
which might altogether challenge the incumbent regime. 
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